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Evaluating Strategies for Negotiating Workers’ Rights in 
Transnational Corporations:  
The Effects of Codes of Conduct and Global Agreements on Workplace Democracy 
 
Abstract 
Following the offshoring of production to developing countries by transnational 
corporations (TNCs), unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
criticised working conditions at TNCs’ offshore factories. This has led to the emergence 
of two different approaches to operationalising TNC responsibilities for workers’ rights 
in developing countries: codes of conduct and global agreements. Despite the 
importance of this development, few studies have systematically compared the effects of 
these two different ways of dealing with workers’ rights. This paper addresses this gap 
by analysing how codes of conduct and global agreements both independently and 
interactively affect workers’ rights. We do this based on a qualitative study of the Sri 
Lankan operations of a Swedish TNC in Sri Lanka, and on interviews with union and 
NGO representatives actively involved in codes of conduct and global agreements. Our 
results indicate that global agreements independently address all the aspects included in 
codes of conduct, while also addressing additional, more process-oriented aspects of 
workers’ rights. Hence, on their own, global agreements seem to comprise the superior 
approach to promoting workers’ rights. Furthermore, our results indicate that promoting 
codes of conduct has negative interactive effects on global agreements. Based on these 
results, we argue that the current focus on codes of conduct is counterproductive for the 
promotion of workers’ rights. 
 
KEY WORDS: code of conduct; corporate responsibility; global agreement; 
international framework agreement; labour practice; non-governmental organization; 
transnational corporation; union; workplace democracy 
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Introduction 
The increasing influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) has brought new 
challenges regarding their responsibilities and actions with respect to workers and their 
rights (Broadhurst, 2000; Murray and Trudeau, 2004; Arthaud-Day, 2005). In pursuit of 
lower costs, TNCs have used offshoring to allocate production and other parts of their 
value chains to developing countries where labour costs are significantly lower than in 
most developed countries (Christerson and Appelbaum, 1995; Hathcote and Nam, 1999; 
Jones, 2005; Taylor, 2005). Along with these lower wages come generally poorer 
working conditions as well (Chan and Senser, 1997; Chan, 1998, 2000; Lee, 1998, 
1999), and a common position is that this development is leading to a ‘race to the 
bottom’  in terms of workers’  rights (Chan and Ross, 2003; Valor, 2005). 
To counteract this development, unions and other non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have sharply criticized the working conditions at the offshore factories of TNCs 
and their suppliers (Frenkel, 2001; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; Frenkel 
and Kim, 2004). This has resulted in enlarged definitions of TNC responsibility for 
workers’  rights, particularly as unions and NGOs have collaborated in their efforts to 
broaden these responsibilities (Gallin, 2000; Connor, 2004; Hale, 2004; Egels-Zandén 
and Hyllman, 2006). Such collaboration has been made difficult by the fact that NGOs 
and unions have operationalised their workers’  rights efforts in two different ways, 
codes of conduct and global agreements, respectively. While codes of conduct and 
global agreements share the same objective, i.e., to increase the responsibility of TNCs 
for workers’  rights (cf. Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Compa, 2004; Roman, 2004), codes 
of conduct are preferred by TNCs and NGOs while unions prefer global agreements 
(Gallin, 2000; Compa, 2004; Connor, 2004). Numerous TNCs have adopted codes of 
conduct (e.g., Schlegelmilch and Houston, 1989; Sethi, 1999; Guillén et al., 2002; 
Nijhof et al., 2003), whereas only a handful have adopted global agreements (Hammer, 
2004; Riisgaard, 2005). 
While codes of conduct and global agreements have both been studied, few, if any, 
studies have systematically compared their respective effects on workers’  rights (cf. 
Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006). Similarly, few studies have focused on the 
interaction between these two approaches. This lack likely stems from the prevalent lack 
of a union perspective in the business ethics literature (Michalos, 1997; Leahy, 2001; 
Riisgaard, 2005), as well as the similar lack of an NGO perspective in the industrial 
relations literature. 
This paper addresses this gap by analysing how codes of conduct and global agreements 
independently as well as interactively affect workers’  rights at the local level. This 
analysis is based on both a qualitative study of the Sri Lankan operations of a Swedish 
TNC (Trelleborg) and interviews with union and NGO representatives actively involved 
in codes of conduct and global agreements. The next section reviews previous research 
into codes of conduct and global agreements, and identifies the main differences 
between them. Then, we outline how workers’  rights could productively be 
operationalised as ‘workplace democracy’ , and present the method used in the study. 
We next present our case findings, and based on these, discuss our results and present 
some initial propositions regarding the effects of codes of conduct and global 
agreements on workplace democracy. In the final section of the paper, we summarise 
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our conclusions, discuss their practical implications, and suggest avenues for further 
research. 
Codes of conduct and global agreements 
Paralleling the corporate interest in codes of conduct considerable research into such 
codes has emerged. Themes in previous research include: i) degree of corporate 
adoption of codes (e.g., White and Montgomery, 1980; Schlegelmilch and Houston, 
1989; Guillén et al., 2002; Nijhof et al., 2003), ii) content of codes from a normative 
perspective (e.g., Murphy, 1995; Sethi and Williams, 2000; Schwartz, 2002; Sethi, 
2002), iii) content of codes from a descriptive perspective (e.g., Montoya and Richard, 
1994; Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999; Kathryn and Miyake, 2001; van Tulder and Kolk, 
2001; Kolk and van Tulder, 2002a, 2002b; Carasco and Singh, 2003; Kaptein, 2004), iv) 
drivers of the adoption of codes (e.g., Weaver, 1993; Diller, 1999; van Tulder and Kolk, 
2001; Roberts, 2003; Bondy et al., 2004), and v) changes induced by codes (e.g., Cassell 
et al., 1997; Cowton and Thompson, 2000; Somers, 2001; Healy and Iles, 2002). Based 
on the findings of previous research into codes of conduct in relation to developing 
countries, it seems that academics and practitioners envision such codes as securing 
individual workers’  rights, as primarily defined by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
However, despite this extensive research into codes of conduct, the research into the 
actual implementation of codes of conduct in developing countries is fairly limited (for 
notable exceptions see Frenkel, 2001; Graafland, 2002; Winstanley et al., 2002; and 
Egels-Zandén, 2006). Hence, much is known of codes of conduct in general, but little is 
known of how codes in practice affect workers’  rights in developing countries. 
While research into codes of conduct has flourished, research into global agreements 
has lagged (Riisgaard, 2005), likely due to the novelty of global agreements. However, 
several recent studies have addressed this lack (Wills, 2002; Carley, 2005; Fairbrother 
and Hammer, 2005; Riisgaard, 2005; Anner et al., 2006), and the major thrust of this 
research has been to analyse the content of global agreements. The general conclusion 
has been that global agreements secure commitment on the part of TNCs to respect 
workers’  rights (Wills, 2002), and typically include standards following ILO, OECD, 
and UN Global Compact guidelines (Carley, 2005; Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005; 
Riisgaard, 2005). Additionally, previous research indicates that global agreements are 
not necessarily restricted to the signatory company, but can stipulate that suppliers must 
also comply. Carley (2005) also demonstrates that global agreements, unlike codes of 
conduct, usually include procedures whereby the signatories jointly monitor and discuss 
implementation, and that this joint monitoring as well as union involvement in 
implementation are often presented as key features of global agreements (Fairbrother 
and Hammer, 2005; Hammer, 2004). Based on these studies, it appears that global 
agreements are envisioned as securing basic rights for individual workers, much as 
codes of conduct are, while providing additional rules concerning both monitoring and 
union involvement. However, hardly any studies have examined the actual 
implementation of global agreements by TNCs; notable exceptions to this neglect 
include Wills (2002) and Riisgaard (2005). 
Arguments for and against codes of conduct and global agreements have been presented 
in previous research. An argument in favour of codes of conduct is that they can 
accommodate a lack of local unions in some regions where TNCs operate (Ählström 
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and Egels-Zandén, 2006), especially in so-called free trade zones (FTZs). Hence, it is 
claimed that global agreements are impossible in certain regions due to the low level of 
unionisation. Furthermore, codes of conduct are also presented as a first step towards 
unionisation, as most codes include a clause allowing and supporting employees to 
organise themselves in local unions (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Frenkel and Kim, 
2004). On the other hand, researchers have also argued that global agreements, unlike 
codes of conduct, provide a legal way to enforce, rather than simply advocate, TNC 
responsibility for workers’  rights (Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Eade, 2004; Riisgaard, 
2005). Similarly, codes of conduct are criticised by unions for not providing as strong 
monitoring mechanisms as unions and global agreements can (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 
2004; Frundt, 2004). Essentially, codes of conduct are regarded by some, notably many 
trade unionists, as little more than convenient public relations tools for TNCs, enabling 
them to avoid negotiating with unions over workers’  rights (e.g., Frundt, 2004). 
However, beyond such anecdotal arguments, there have been no systematic comparisons 
of the benefits and drawbacks of codes of conduct vs. global agreements, when 
implemented independently as well as in combination. The present paper addresses this 
lack by making such a comparison. 
Defining workers’ rights as ‘workplace democracy’ 
A first step in analysing the effects of codes of conduct and global agreements on 
‘workers’  rights’  is to develop an operational definition of these rights. Previous 
research into ‘workers’  rights’  in the corporate responsibility literature has used either 
fairly vague definitions of ‘workers’  rights’  or definitions based on the well-known ILO 
and UN conventions (e.g., Frenkel, 2001; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; O’ Rourke, 2003). 
Instead of adopting such definitions, we believe that a promising and more theoretically 
anchored complementary definition of ‘workers’  rights’  can be formulated by referring 
to the literature on ‘workplace democracy’ . So far, research into workplace democracy 
has not been integrated into the corporate responsibility literature, likely because of the 
lack of a union perspective in this literature (cf. Michalos, 1997; Leahy, 2001; 
Riisgaard, 2005; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006). 
A central objective of workers and union officials, second only to their wish for 
economic and social security, has been to extend into the economic sphere democratic 
principles similar to those that form the foundation of the political sphere in Western 
democracies (Derber, 1970). The concept of industrial or workplace democracy 
nonetheless largely means different things to different people and groups (Schurman 
and Eaton, 1996). However, one common feature often perceived to be synonymous 
with workplace democracy is union representation (e.g., Blum, 1953), although union 
representation was found in the 1960s to be a necessary but insufficient condition for 
effectively addressing issues such as growing alienation at work (Schurman and Eaton, 
1996). As the social and political developments of the 1960s spawned a resurgence of 
various forms of workplace democracy in the 1970s, Derber (1970) proposed a model 
containing nine principles for defining workplace democracy geared towards an 
American context.1 This pioneering work was subsequently extended by other 
workplace democracy theorists (e.g., Walker, 1974; Greenberg, 1975; Bernstein, 1976; 
Thorsrud, 1977), who examined empirical evidence relating to new forms of worker 
participation in the United States and especially in Sweden and Norway. Based on this 
evidence, new alternate models of workplace democracy were proposed (e.g., Pateman, 
1970; Hunnius et al., 1973; Tannenbaum et al., 1974; Herbst, 1976; Zwerdling, 1978; 
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Witte, 1980). More recently, the concept of workplace democracy has been geared 
towards ideas of labour−management co-operation or employee involvement (e.g., 
Simmons and Mares, 1983; Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton, 1987; Eaton, 1990; Cooke, 
1991; Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992). 
In attempting to synthesise these previous findings and models of workplace democracy, 
we will take as our starting point a modification of Schurman and Eaton’ s (1996) six-
component framework of a democratic workplace, a modification based primarily on 
Derber (1970) and Bernstein (1976, 1980). Briefly outlined in Table 1, the framework 
consists of six components of workplace democracy: i) shared sovereignty over all 
levels of decision making, ii) opportunities for direct and indirect participation in 
decision making, iii) access to complete information and education necessary for 
responsible decision making, iv) guaranteed equal rights for individuals and respect for 
individual dignity, v) the right to at least minimum economic, health and safety, and 
environmental standards, and vi) the right to a fair share of the surplus value created by 
one’ s work. 
Component: Description: 
1) Shared sovereignty 
The formal right to co-determine the nature and outcomes of 
decisions, i.e., bilaterally or multilaterally shared decision-making 
power. 
2) Participation 
The right of employees to exercise their sovereignty both directly 
and through representation of their own choosing. This requires 
organised interest groups. 
3) Access to information and education 
The access to managerial-level knowledge and information about 
the corporation, as well as opportunities to learn new skills that will 
enable employees to make use of this information. 
4) Guaranteed individual rights 
The existence of individual rights such as freedom of speech and 
assembly, freedom from discrimination, petition of grievances and 
due process, and election of representatives immune from 
discharge. 
5) Minimum standards 
The level of material wellbeing necessary for economic and social 
security and independence. This includes protection from the 
arbitrary use of authority. 
6) Right to “fair share of value” The right of employees to claim a part of the surplus value created by their work, comparable to the claim made by the firm’ s owners. 
Table 1: Six Components of Workplace Democracy 
 
This framework is useful in at least two ways when analysing the effect of codes of 
conduct and global agreements on workers’  rights. First, it synthesises the extensive 
previous research into workplace democracy into a concrete operational definition. 
Second, it distinguishes between the components of workplace democracy related to 
negotiation processes (components one to three), and those related to negotiation 
outcome (components four to six). This distinction illustrates how the process and 
outcome dimensions are separate while still both being part of workplace democracy. 
Given these advantages, we propose that the definition outlined above provides a useful 
theoretically anchored operational definition of ‘workers’  rights’  applicable in both 
industrial relations and corporate responsibility research. 
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Method 
In analysing how codes of conduct and global agreements independently and 
interactively affect workplace democracy, we used material gathered both from 
interviews (with union and NGO representatives involved in codes of conduct and 
global agreements) and a qualitative study (of the operations of the Swedish TNC 
Trelleborg in free trade zones in Sri Lanka). The interviews with union and NGO 
representatives are used at a general level in discussing the independent and interactive 
effects of codes of conduct and global agreements on workplace democracy. We draw 
on the study of Trelleborg’ s operations in illustrating the independent effects of codes of 
conduct on workplace democracy, as well as in discussing the interactive effects of 
codes of conduct and global agreements. Regarding these interactive effects, the 
Trelleborg study is cited in discussing the process of local union formation in TNCs 
with a code of conduct, i.e., to determine whether codes of conduct support (positive 
interactive effects) or counteract (negative interactive effect) the signing of global 
agreements and the formation of local unions (a pre-requisite for signing global 
agreements). 
In 2005 and 2006, 12 representatives from Swedish unions (six representatives) and 
NGOs (six representatives) actively involved in codes of conduct and global agreements 
were interviewed using semi-structured interviews (lasting on average an hour). The 
representatives all came from different organisations and were each responsible for 
these issues in their organisations. The representatives were chosen after having been 
identified as the most influential Swedish unions and NGOs involved in workers’  rights 
in developing countries. We started with several representatives whom we identified, 
based on prior research, as highly influential in workers’  rights; we then asked them 
after the completion of the interview to list the organisations and individuals that they 
perceived to be the most influential with respect to workers’  rights, codes of conduct, 
and/or global agreements. Once no further individuals or organisations were identified 
as ‘influential’  by any of the interviewed representatives, we ended the interview study. 
The interviews focused on discussing the independent as well as interactive effects of 
codes of conduct and global agreements on workers’  rights. The data were then coded 
by the two authors in order to identify themes within each interview and differences 
between interviews. The resulting interview descriptions were sent to most of the 
interviewees, and their comments on the descriptions were incorporated into the final 
case description. 
The Trelleborg study was based on data collected from interviews and on written 
documentation of Trelleborg’ s operations in Sri Lanka (Wingborg, 2005). Forty-five 
semi-structured interviews (lasting on average forty-five minutes) were conducted 
between 2004 and 2006 with representatives of: i) Trelleborg management (representing 
both the firm’ s headquarters in Sweden and its operations in Sri Lanka), ii) workers at 
Trelleborg’ s factories in Sri Lanka, iii) Trelleborg’ s union (in Sri Lanka and Sweden) 
and the firm’ s European Workers’  Council), iv) other union representatives (from Sri 
Lankan unions in the free trade zones, Swedish unions, and global unions), v) Sri-
Lankan governmental organisations, and vi) Swedish non-governmental organisations 
involved in the studied process. The interviews focused on discussing Trelleborg’ s code 
of conduct, its implementation in Sri Lanka, and the formation of local unions in 
Trelleborg’ s Sri Lankan factories. The written documentation (e.g., webpages, policies, 
media articles, letters, and e-mails between the involved actors) was used primarily to 
validate information obtained in interview, and few inconsistencies were found in this 
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way. The obtained data were then coded so as to construct a description of Trelleborg’ s 
code of conduct, its perceived implementation in Sri Lanka, and the process of creating 
local unions at Trelleborg’ s factories in Sri Lanka. Regarding the process of creating a 
particular local union, key decision points were identified throughout the process and 
the involved actors’  positions at each of these decision points were outlined. These 
descriptions were then sent to most of the interviewees for validation. All their 
suggested changes were then incorporated into the final case description. 
Trelleborg’s operations in Sri Lanka 
Free trade zones in Sri Lanka 
Since the mid 1970s, the number of free trade zones (FTZs) has consistently increased 
in Sri Lanka. FTZs are governed by special legislation, and firms investing in them are 
given special benefits, such as free land, low-interest loans, tax exemptions, and 
expanded infrastructure. The Board of Investment (BOI) is the government agency 
responsible for operations in Sri Lankan FTZs, of which the largest are Koggala and 
Katunayake (which together have approximately 80 firms and 60,000 employees) and 
Biyagama (with approximately 50 firms and 20,000 employees). 
Unlike FTZs in Bangladesh and India, there are no legal bans on unions in Sri Lanka. 
However, in practice, the formation of local unions has been made difficult, as the 
Board of Investment has not intervened to guarantee union rights, despite national 
regulations dictating that employees have the right to form unions and that employers 
are obliged to recognise them. For example, the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions has reported that union rights are rarely respected in Sri Lankan FTZs, 
that firms systematically try to prevent union organising, and that the right to assembly 
frequently is denied (ICFTU, 2004). ILO, the Clean Clothes Campaign, and the Sri 
Lankan Labour Department, among others, have also criticised operations in Sri Lankan 
FTZs for violating ILO’ s core labour standards. 
In Sri Lankan FTZs (as in FTZs elsewhere), so-called employees’  councils (EC) are 
often used as substitutes for local unions. An EC consists of employee representatives 
selected by the employees under the supervision of firm management. However, 
according to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the elections as well 
as the agendas of ECs are often manipulated by firm management. According to Sri 
Lankan regulations, ECs represent employees in collective bargaining unless a local 
union exists representing at least 40 per cent of the employees (in which case the union 
represents the employees). This EC regulation is central to regulating workers’  rights in 
FTZs, as will be illustrated in the Trelleborg case. For a local union to represent the 
employees in collective bargaining, it is required that the employer recognise the union. 
The employer is required to do so if at least 40 per cent of the employees are organised 
through the union. However, in practice, the employer can create various obstacles to 
recognising a particular union, as well as try to organise an EC and claim that its 
representatives are the legitimate employee representatives. Such actions are, according 
to union and NGO representatives, highly common among corporations, but should be 
eliminated when TNCs adopt codes of conduct banning such actions. In this way, codes 
of conduct could potentially support the formation of local unions. 
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Trelleborg in Sri Lanka 
Trelleborg is a global industrial group specialising in advanced polymer technology and 
active in several industries, such as the aerospace, agricultural, automotive, 
transportation, and oil and gas industries. With annual sales of approximately ¼
million, the group comprises approximately 22,000 employees across 40 countries. 
Currently, Trelleborg has two tyre production facilities in Sri Lanka that annually 
produce approximately half a million tires; in 2004, these factories employed a total of 
691 employees (of which 250 work in the Biyagama FTZ). 
Like most TNC codes of conduct (cf. Frenkel, 2001; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; 
Murphy and Mathew, 2001; Graafland, 2002; Sethi, 2002; Winstanley et al., 2002), 
Trelleborg’ s code of conduct serves to define and secure minimum workers’  rights at its 
factories across the globe. The content of Trelleborg’ s code of conduct is also well in 
line with that of most such TNC codes, encompassing aspects such as wages, working 
hours, child labour, and forced labour. The code also clearly states that the firm respects 
employees’  right to be represented by unions (according to interviewed Trelleborg 
managers this statement is intended to be equivalent to the ILO conventions on freedom 
of association and right to collective bargaining). 
Overall, our study of Trelleborg’ s operations in Sri Lanka indicates that these code of 
conduct standards are well implemented. Trelleborg’ s Sri Lankan factories seem to 
comply with central code of conduct requirements such as working hours, minimum 
wages, overtime compensation, health and safety education, child labour, insurance, and 
employee contracts. However, regarding one key requirement of the code of conduct – 
freedom of association and right to collective bargaining – implementation is less clear-
cut. We will focus on this aspect in the remainder of this case description, in order to 
describe the interactive effects of codes of conduct and global agreements. 
The Trelleborg vs. FTZ&GSEU conflict 
In the fifteen months between January 2004 and March 2005, a conflict slowly built up, 
erupted, and was resolved between Trelleborg and a number of workers who formed a 
local union belonging to the Free Trade Zones & General Services Employees Union 
(FTZ&GSEU). FTZ&GSEU is a rapidly growing, politically independent national union 
in Sri Lanka, currently enrolling approximately 15,000 members in and around the 
FTZs. FTZ&GSEU is a part of the global union, the International Textile, Garment and 
Leather Workers’  Federation (ITGLWF), which in turn co-operates closely with ICFTU. 
The conflict concerned attempts of Trelleborg’ s Sri Lankan employees to form a local 
union and get Trelleborg to recognise it. Table 2 presents a brief account of the 
important milestones of this conflict. 
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The Trelleborg vs. FTZ&GSEU conflict 
Fall 2003 Employees at Trelleborg’ s factory in Bigayama decide to start a local union affiliated 
with FTZ&GSEU. 
Spring 2004 Five letters are sent by the local union to Trelleborg’ s management requesting that 
Trelleborg recognise the local union. No reply is sent to either of these letters. In the 
summer of 2004, FTZ&GSEU on behalf of the local union contacts ITGLWF, the 
Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign (SCCC), and the Swedish Industrial Workers’  Union 
(SIWU) who all refer to Trelleborg’ s code of conduct stating that Trelleborg respects 
employees’  rights to be represented by a union of their choice. 
July 6th, 2004 The local union and FTZ&GSEU arrange a meeting with Trelleborg hosted by the 
FTZ’ s Commissioner of Labour. Trelleborg’ s legal representative declares that 
Trelleborg “accepts the workers’  union”. A letter sent by the ITGLWF in August to 
Trelleborg inquiring why Trelleborg still has not formally recognised the local union is 
not answered. 
October 6th, 2004 Trelleborg’ s Sri Lankan personnel manager instructs a number of employees to form a 
new Employees’  Council. The employees refuse to form a new council, citing the local 
union. 
January 14th, 2005 In a meeting between members of the local union, the general director of FTZ&GSEU, 
and Trelleborg’ s regional manager, Trelleborg states, without offering any examples, 
that they won’ t recognise the local union since FTZ&GSEU has “through its actions 
closed a number of factories in Sri Lanka and forced them to move to China”.  
March 15th, 2005 A strike breaks out at Trelleborg’ s factory in Sri Lanka, triggered by a corporate 
decision to adjust workers’  bonus wages so as to exclude temporary workers. While the 
workers respond that they are willing to discuss changes in future wages, they insist 
that the old criteria should be used for wages due. Trelleborg’ s management refuses and 
states that the “error” should be corrected immediately. 
March 16th, 2005 The general director of ITGLWF sends a letter to the CEO of Trelleborg and the 
business area executive at Trelleborg Wheel System accusing Trelleborg of 
“unacceptable behaviour” in refusing to recognize the local union and threatening to 
close down the factory. ITGLWF also demands that the factory be immediately 
reopened or they will report Trelleborg to OECD for violating OECD’ s guidelines for 
multinational corporations. In Sweden, SIWU’ s chairman calls Trelleborg’ s HR 
manager three times citing Trelleborg’ s code of conduct. 
March 21st, 2005 Trelleborg announces that the employees should report to the company and resume 
work; 18 workers are not welcome back as they, according to Trelleborg, have incited 
the conflict resulting in a six-day halt in production. Coincidently, these 18 workers are 
also the core of the local union, including its president, vice president, and several 
board members. The workers refuse to return to work under these conditions. Some 
circumstances exist to suggest that Trelleborg was not only disturbed by the wage 
conflict but also wanted to obstruct the local union. For example, one of the suspended 
workers, a member of the local union’ s inner circle, was on vacation when the conflict 
erupted and could have had little to do with the conflict. The conflict is becoming an 
economic liability to Trelleborg. 
March 30th, 2005 Trelleborg retreats from its position and accepts that all workers can return to work in 
exchange for a letter of apology from the local union for its behaviour during the 
conflict, on the condition that the letter will never be used in any capacity against the 
local union. The local union officials agree to this and consider this a victory, as they 
have achieved their goal of having the local union recognised while no union officials 
have been suspended. A year and three months after first contact, the local union is 
finally recognised by Trelleborg. 




In the aftermath of the conflict, Trelleborg’ s HR manager claimed that he was pleased 
that the conflict could be resolved, and emphasised that the causes of the conflict were 
“ unfortunate circumstances” . He argued that there were never any intentions on the part 
of Trelleborg to oppose the formation on a local union, and that Trelleborg’ s attitude is 
reflected by its code of conduct. Neither does he believe that Trelleborg can draw any 
general conclusions from this conflict, as it was caused by unfortunate particular 
circumstances not part of a general pattern of union rights violations in Sri Lankan 
FTZs. 
Prior to the Sri Lankan conflict, Trelleborg had also been involved in other conflicts 
with local unions, for example, in Copperhill and Hartville in the USA. When asked if 
this could not be seen as a sign of anti-union sentiments in Trelleborg, the HR manager 
again responded that this was not the case and that Trelleborg’ s code of conduct reflects 
the attitude of Trelleborg. 
Independent effects of codes and global agreements 
Independent effects of codes of conduct 
One commonly cited advantage of codes of conduct over global agreements is that 
codes are useful in countries with weak unions or a low union presence (cf. Ählström 
and Egels-Zandén, 2006). The Trelleborg case supports this view, as prior to 2004, there 
were limited possibilities for Trelleborg to enter into global agreements, due to the lack 
of unionisation in their Sri Lankan factories. In general, our interviews with union and 
NGO representatives also support this view. These interviewees, especially NGO 
representatives, argued that in instances of weak unions, codes of conduct could drive 
development towards securing basic individual rights, i.e., the fourth and fifth 
components of our framework of workplace democracy: guaranteed individual rights 
and minimum standards. Most TNC codes, like Trelleborg’ s code, define these basic 
individual rights based on the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (cf. Frenkel, 2001; van 
Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Murphy and Mathew, 2001; Graafland, 2002; Sethi, 2002; 
Winstanley et al., 2002). The question then becomes how well codes of conduct secure 
such basic individual rights in practice. 
The Trelleborg study demonstrates that in this case the code of conduct was largely 
implemented at their Sri Lankan factories. Central requirements, such as salary levels, 
working hours, vacations, child labour, and insurance, were in compliance with the code 
of conduct standards. This suggests a somewhat higher degree of compliance with the 
TNC’ s code of conduct than has been found by previous research into compliance with 
codes of conduct in developing countries (Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel and Scott, 2002; 
Graafland, 2002; Sethi, 2002; Winstanley et al., 2002; Frenkel and Kim, 2004). This 
discrepancy is likely due to differences between the types of factories studied in this and 
previous research. Trelleborg’ s Sri Lankan factories employ mainly male workers with 
skills that are more difficult to replace than those of the female workers employed in the 
consumer industries (e.g., the garment, footwear, and toy industries) that have been the 
focus of previous research. Hence, both the salary levels (an identified problem in 
previous research) and the workers’  bargaining power can be expected to be higher in 
Trelleborg’ s factories than in the factories previously studied. Consequently, the higher 
compliance levels found in this study seem reasonable considering the differences 
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between this and previous research. However, while Trelleborg achieved generally high 
compliance, there were clear breaches of the code’ s standard regarding employees’  right 
to freedom of association. The firm consistently for over a year obstructed the formation 
of the local union, despite the fact that its code of conduct includes paragraphs dealing 
with employees’  right to form unions. 
Thus, the Trelleborg case and the interviews with union and NGO representatives 
suggest that codes of conduct at best secure two of what we have labelled the outcome 
components of workplace democracy: guaranteed individual rights and minimum 
standards. Furthermore, it appears that the effects of codes of conduct on these outcome 
components, in practice, are dependent on industry and country variables. While codes 
of conduct aim to secure outcome components, our data suggest that they do not address 
any of the three process components of workplace democracy: shared sovereignty, 
participation, and access to information and education. In fact, our data indicate that 
codes of conduct largely ignore issues of workers’  influence and process-oriented 
aspects of workers’  rights representation. One main reason for this, articulated by a 
number of interviewees, is that codes of conduct are unilaterally determined by TNCs: 
they do not presuppose the existence of a local union and are based on rule-setting 
rather than ongoing social dialogue. Hence, our results indicate that codes of conduct at 
best address the first two outcome components of workplace democracy (guaranteed 
individual rights and minimum standards), while not addressing the third output 
component (right to fair share of value) or the three process components (shared 
sovereignty, participation, and access to information and education). 
Independent effects of global agreements 
One major finding from our interviews is that global agreements fundamentally secure 
the same basic individual rights as codes of conduct do, i.e., the same outcome 
components of workplace democracy. Union and NGO representatives both claimed 
that global agreements, like most codes of conduct, contain all relevant ILO and UN 
labour standards. In particular, the interviewed NGO representatives argued that the real 
difference between codes of conduct and global agreements does not lie in their 
respective contents, but rather in the way these two solutions are monitored. These 
findings suggest that global agreements, like codes of conduct, if successfully 
implemented do ensure the fourth and fifth components of workplace democracy: 
guaranteed individual rights, and minimum standards. 
Additionally, global agreements, unlike codes of conduct, also address the process 
components of workplace democracy. First, global agreements presuppose the existence 
of local unions, and the signing a global agreement per definition leads to the TNC 
acknowledging the local union as a legitimate counterpart. Hence, the unilateral nature 
of codes of conduct is replaced by a bilateral union−TNC negotiation structure. In turn, 
such a bilateral structure is, by many of our interviewed union and NGO representatives, 
claimed to be an important starting point for a development process, continuously 
leading to increasing degrees of worker participation and co-determination. Second, 
global agreements also, according to the interviewed union representatives, oftentimes 
include specific standards concerning union representation, information sharing, and 
skill development, i.e., their content is broader than that of codes of conduct. Third, 
global agreements are also, according to our union interviewees, described as creating 
better working relationships between local and global unions, which is argued as 
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strengthening local unions’  bargaining power. In sum, our conducted interviews indicate 
that global agreements at best enhance the preconditions for achieving all of the three 
process components of workplace democracy: shared sovereignty, participation, and 
access to information and education. 
Only a few studies have analysed actual compliance with global agreements. The main 
findings of these studies are that global agreements suffer from similar implementation 
problems regarding wages, working hours, and the right to organise as do codes of 
conduct (Hammer, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005). Our interviewed NGO representatives even 
stated that they believe that global agreements in practice are less vigilantly monitored, 
and hence less successfully implemented, than codes of conduct are. While codes often 
are monitored by external parties, global agreements are mainly monitored by local and 
global unions that, according to several interviewed NGO representatives, have limited 
experience in such monitoring. However, the NGO representatives by no means claimed 
that current code of conduct monitoring is satisfactory (in fact, they often asserted the 
opposite), only that it tends to be more effective than current global agreement 
monitoring is. Several researchers would support the claim that code of conduct 
monitoring is deficient in several important respects (O’ Rourke, 1997, 2000, 2002, 
2003; Burnett and Mahon, 2001; Florini, 2003; French and Wokutch, 2005; Egels-
Zandén, 2006); however, there has been too little research into global agreements to 
validate the claim that global agreement monitoring is even less effective. In sharp 
contrast to the NGO representatives’  view, the union representatives, and some 
researchers, even claim that the global agreement monitoring conducted by unions with 
a local presence is more effective than external code of conduct monitoring (cf. Braun 
and Gearhart, 2004; Frundt, 2004). Hence, while both approaches suffer from 
monitoring and implementation problems, it is currently unclear whether either of them 
suffers more from such problems than the other. 
Comparing the independent effects of codes and agreements 
Table 3 summarises the conclusions of the initial analysis of the independent effects of 
codes of conduct and global agreements. 
Component: Codes of Conduct: Global Agreements: 
1) Shared sovereignty  X 
2) Participation  X 
3) Access to information and education  X 
4) Guaranteed individual rights X X 
5) Minimum standards X X 
6) Right to fair share of value   
Table 3: A Workplace Democracy-Based Evaluation of Codes of Conduct and Global 
Agreements 
 
From the table, we can conclude that codes of conduct strive to secure the fourth and 
fifth workplace democracy components, while global agreements strive to secure the 
first five components. Hence, we can infer that global agreements clearly are superior 
for promoting workplace democracy, assuming that codes of conduct and global 
agreements are equally effectively implemented. The two outcome advantages of codes 
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of conduct are equally secured by global agreements, while global agreements also 
realise three other, process-oriented advantages related to union and worker 
participation and influence. 
It is also interesting to note that neither codes of conduct nor global agreements address 
the sixth component of workplace democracy: fair share of value. Historically, some 
attempts have been made to achieve this component of workplace democracy, perhaps 
most notably in Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s through failed attempts to introduce the 
so-called wage earners’  funds (e.g., Albrecht and Deutsch, 2002; Henrekson and 
Jakobsson, 2002). 
A preliminary interpretation of this failure to address fair share of value is that both 
codes of conduct and global agreements fail to adequately address workplace 
democracy. This would signal a deficiency in the design of both the code of conduct and 
global agreement approaches. One reason for the deficiency may well be that unions and 
other workers’  rights representatives lack sufficient bargaining power at an international 
level to enforce such demands, partly due to the lack of an international institutional 
framework surrounding the operations of TNCs. Hence, not including the fair share of 
value component of workplace democracy could be seen as a tactical decision made by 
unions and NGOs. 
A second possible interpretation is that attempts to secure fair share of value are no 
longer ideologically relevant to unions and NGOs. In turn, this could be related to the 
shift of unions and the workers’  rights movement from their historic, Marxist definition 
of class, class struggle, and workplace democracy in favour of a more Weberian view of 
these concepts (e.g., Weber, 1947). Such a shift may well have been induced or 
accentuated by the introduction of NGOs as workers’  rights representatives. The main 
difference between a Marxist approach and other approaches, including the Weberian, is 
the relative importance given to control over the means of production and change in the 
capitalistic society (e.g., Korpi, 1978). According to this second interpretation, it is thus 
relevant to amend our suggested operationalisation of workplace democracy so as not to 
include the sixth component – right to fair share of value – rather than to argue for a 
deficit in codes and global agreements. 
So far, when analysing the independent effects of codes of conduct and global 
agreements on workplace democracy, we have portrayed the solutions as being in 
conflict with each other, i.e., we chose either codes or global agreements. However, as 
several of our interviewees note, codes and global agreements could also be seen as 
complementary. Since we have shown that global agreements address all the 
components that codes address, there are no advantages for proponents of workplace 
democracy to work with codes of conduct in situations where global agreements already 
exist. Our interviews with union and NGO representatives also support this position. 
However, the interviewees, especially those representing NGOs, stress that if global 
agreements do not exist (and they generally do not), codes of conduct comprise a 
valuable tool for both improving workers’  rights and supporting the formation of local 
unions (in turn, a prerequisite for global agreements). Hence, codes could serve as a first 
step towards global agreements. 
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Interactive effects of codes of conduct and global agreements 
The second step in analysing the effects of codes of conduct and global agreements is 
then to identify any possible interactive effects of these two approaches. There are two 
distinct outlooks on such interactive effects: i) negative and competition and ii) positive 
and complementary. According to the first, researchers, and some of our interviewed 
union representatives, portray codes of conduct as detrimental to global agreements 
(e.g., Justice, 2003; Roman, 2004; Lipschutz, 2004). Codes are depicted as substituting 
and obstructing the signing of global agreements. The second outlook, in contrast, view 
codes of conduct as supporting the promotion of union influence (cf. Braun and 
Gearhart, 2004; Connor, 2004; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Hale, 2004). Several of our 
interviewed NGO representatives, and some union representatives, embraced this 
outlook, describing codes as a first step towards the formation of local unions. 
The Trelleborg study presents a preliminary argument in favour of negative conflictual 
interactive effects, since it indicates that codes of conduct can be used to prevent rather 
than foster the formation of local unions. Before and during the studied Trelleborg 
conflict, Trelleborg representatives used their code of conduct as a smokescreen, citing 
it to ‘prove’  their espoused attitude favouring the recognition of local unions, while 
repeatedly flouting it in practice in its operations abroad. Rather, in the same unilateral 
spirit in which codes of conduct are adopted, Trelleborg management perceived 
themselves to have the right to define whether or not a specific local union should be 
allowed to represent the workers. Hence, Trelleborg management acted as if they, rather 
than the workers, had the right and power to decide who should represent the workers, 
i.e., the right to decide which unions and/or employees’  councils were legitimate. This 
behaviour is similar to that of TNCs in their codes of conduct unilaterally defining the 
outcome components of workplace democracy – guaranteed individual rights and 
minimum standards – without involving, or negotiating with, local unions. 
This behaviour – formalistically espousing the recognition of local unions through 
publicly announced codes of conduct while acting in a contrary manner – can be viewed 
as a clear example of a decoupling practice, whereby Trelleborg publicly claimed to do 
things in one way to gain legitimacy with its external stakeholders while actually 
maintaining the status quo in their local operations (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Orton and Weick, 1990; Brunsson, 2002). In this way, codes of conduct potentially 
provide TNCs a way to improve their legitimacy regarding workers’  rights, while 
avoiding both the signing of global agreements and actually promoting the formation of 
local unions. Several of the interviewed union representatives claimed that numerous 
TNCs have demonstrated such behaviour, not just Trelleborg. Clearly, these findings 
provide support for the conflict outlook, that codes of conduct have negative interactive 
effects on workers’  rights. 
A second argument in favour of negative conflictual interactive effects is that previous 
research has demonstrated that the failure of unions and NGOs to collaborate on a single 
approach weakens their bargaining power vis-à-vis TNCs (Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 
2006). Hence, since global agreements comprise the superior alternative, efforts – 
mainly of NGOs – to promote codes of conduct risk having negative interactive effects 
on workers’  rights in developing countries. Rather, according to this reasoning, NGOs 
and unions should collaborate on promoting the global agreement approach. 
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Third, while several of our interviewees identified TNCs that had used codes of conduct 
to gain legitimacy while maintaining the status quo regarding unions in their local 
operations, no interviewees could identify the opposite, i.e., a TNC that after adopting 
codes of conduct became increasingly supportive of the formation of local unions. As 
noted above, most interviewees claim that codes of conduct have led to improvements in 
conditions such as working hours, minimum wages, and child labour, i.e., the fourth and 
fifth outcome components of workplace democracy. However, no concrete examples in 
which codes of conduct had similar positive effects on workplace democracy in terms of 
fostering the formation of unions could be cited by either the interviewed NGO or union 
representatives. Several interviewees argued for the vague notion that codes could 
reasonably be expected to foster the formation of local unions, but none were able to 
provide a single concrete example of this. Of course, this does not imply that there are 
no such examples, only that there are few indications of positive interactive effects in 
our data. 
A fourth interactive effect may be observed when distinguishing between the content of 
codes of conduct and global agreements, on the one hand, and monitoring their 
implementation, on the other. While our interviewees made it clear that global 
agreements are superior in terms of content, they also argued that unions usually lack 
sufficient knowledge and resources to effectively monitor the implementation of global 
agreements, and maintained that NGOs have important knowledge and resources for this 
purpose. As a result, a number of NGOs have decided to choose global agreements as 
their preferred approach, while focusing on providing monitoring services. This would 
be one way for the various workers’  representatives to effectively pool their resources to 
achieve a broader definition  and better implementation of workers’  rights at TNCs’  
operations. It also suggests that while codes of conduct as such may have negative 
interactive effects on global agreements and local unions, this does not imply that 
workers’  rights-oriented NGOs as such need have any negative interactive effects on 
workers’  rights at TNCs’  operations. Rather, it highlights the possible positive 
interactive effects of constructive co-operation between unions and NGOs (cf. Egels-
Zandén and Hyllman, 2006). 
In sum, both our interviews and the Trelleborg study indicate that codes of conduct have 
negative interactive effects on promoting the formation of local unions and the signing 
of global agreements. Hence, in contrast to the positive complementary outlook on the 
interactive effect, our data support the negative conflictual outlook. However, an 
interesting opportunity lies in the possibility of having NGOs monitor global 
agreements to complement union monitoring. Hence, the negative interactive effects 
stem from a seemingly conflictual relationship between codes of conduct and global 
agreements, not from a necessarily conflictual relationship between NGOs and unions. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that while codes of conduct are by far the dominant 
approach to operationalising TNC responsibility for workers’  rights in developing 
countries, they are inferior to global agreements for promoting workers’  rights. Codes of 
conduct narrowly focus on the outcome components of workplace democracy, while 
neglecting process components such as shared sovereignty, participation, and access to 
information and education. Global agreements, on the other hand, address all the 
outcome components in a similar manner as codes of conduct, while also addressing the 
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process components of workplace democracy. Hence, global agreements comprise a 
more holistic approach to promoting workers’  rights than codes of conduct do. 
Importantly, our study also indicates that codes of conduct do not seem to serve as a 
first step to the formation of local unions and the signing of global agreements. On the 
contrary, our results indicate that the adoption and promotion of codes of conduct have 
negative conflictual interactive effects on global agreements. Consequently, we argue 
that proponents of workers’  rights often face a choice between codes of conduct or 
global agreements, not a choice of codes of conduct and global agreements. 
When facing this choice, proponents of workers’  rights are essentially choosing between 
a ‘quick fix’  or a ‘long haul’ . The main advantages of codes of conduct are that they 
improve two of the outcome components of workplace democracy, do not presuppose 
the existence of local unions, and that TNCs are willing to adopt them. These 
advantages clearly make codes a quick and easy way to promote workers’  rights in 
developing countries. Global agreements, on the other hand, presuppose the existence of 
local unions and face the hurdle of TNCs’  unwillingness to sign them. However, it is 
also the one of the two approaches that addresses the process components of workplace 
democracy. 
The study’ s most important practical implication relates to this choice of whether 
workers’  rights advocates want to strive for a ‘quick fix’  or a ‘long haul’ . NGOs, unions, 
and academics promoting codes of conduct as the way to operationalise TNC 
responsibility need to understand that such support seems to be counterproductive for 
the promotion of a holistic version of workers’  rights. Codes represent unilaterally 
extended workers’  rights defined by TNCs that provide limited negotiation support to 
help workers increase their long-term bargaining power, and impose a definition of 
workers’  rights in developing countries over which the workers’  have little influence, 
i.e., those concerned are not allowed to define their own terms (cf. Ählström and Egels-
Zandén, 2006). Given this, we believe that proponents of workers’  rights should stop 
settling for the code of conduct quick fix, and instead redirect and pool their resources to 
pressure TNCs to support the formation of local unions and the signing of global 
agreements. In addition, NGOs could provide valuable knowledge and resources to help 
improve the compliance monitoring of global agreements. Codes of conduct could still, 
of course, serve as important internal corporate policy documents. However, NGOs, 
unions and academics are well advised not to settle for these documents and should 
instead consistently advocate the signing of global agreements. However, in countries 
such as China and in some free trade zones where local unions are banned, codes of 
conduct will, prior to legislation changes, still comprise the only realistic way to 
operationalise workers’  rights. 
This study also has implications for further research. First, it demonstrates the need for 
more large-scale research into the interactive effects of codes of conduct and global 
agreements. If our hypothesis is correct, that codes of conduct have negative interactive 
effects on the formation of local unions and the signing of global agreements, this has 
extensive practical implications for the global workers’  rights movement. Therefore, 
more extensive empirical studies are essential to shed light on this empirical question. 
Second, the study also indicates a need to examine why fair share of value has been 
excluded from codes of conduct and global agreements. Is this a conscious shift in 
policy on the part of workers’  rights representatives, or simply a gradual adaptation to 
ongoing political trends? Third, more research is needed that compares the monitoring 
problems of codes of conduct and global agreements. Our study found controversy 
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among both researchers and practitioners concerning the relative efficiency of the 
monitoring of these two approaches. 
                                                 
1
 Derber’ s (1970) nine principles of workplace democracy are: representation, participation, equal rights 
and opportunities, right of dissent, due process, responsibility, minimum standards, information, and 
personal dignity. 
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